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ABSTRACT
This study explores how aspects of perceived national culture affect the information security 
attitudes and behavior of employees. Data was collected using 19 semi-structured interviews in 
Ireland and the United States of America (US). The main findings are that US employees in the 
ob served organizations are more inclined to adopt formalized information security policies and 
procedures than Irish employees, and are also more likely to have higher levels of compliance and 
lower levels of non-compliance.
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Introduction
National statistics reveal that the number of data breaches 
experienced in Ireland in 2017 was 26% higher than the 
previous year (IDPC, 2017). Comparable figures for the US 
show that the combined number of personal and corporate 
data breaches in 2017 increased by 12% from that of the 
previous twelve months, giving rise to total costs in 2017 of
$138m (FBI, 2016, 2017). On a global scale, the level of 
digital theft and fraud is increasing in all regions of the 
world (PwC, 2018). The need for employees to be security-
conscious and vigilant is therefore much greater than ever.
Most of the literature on information systems secur-
ity over the past 25 years has focused on technical 
solutions. In their extensive review of 1588 security 
papers published between 1993 and 2012, Silic and 
Back (2014) found that only 5% of them were con-
cerned with human aspects of information systems 
security. However, humans are very often the most 
vulnerable link in the security chain (Karlsson & 
Hedström, 2014). For example, the UK Information 
Commissioner disclosed that human error accounts 
for 62% of all reported security incidents (Saran, 
2016). It is therefore very important to understand the 
factors that cause humans to behave in the ways that 
they do in relation to information security.
From their meta-analysis of behavioral information 
security literature published in the period from 2000 to 
2013, Karlsson, Åström, and Karlsson (2015) identified 
a number of areas which thus far have received very little 
attention, amongst them the relationship between national
culture and employee security behavior. In their synthesis
of the security policy research literature, Cram, Proudfoot,
and D’Arcy (2017) draw attention to the relationship
between organizational culture and policy compliance but
make no reference whatsoever to the influence of national
culture. Similarly, Moody, Siponen, and Pahnila (2018)
propose a unified model of information security policy
compliance which draws upon 11 very well-established
theories but their model takes no cognizance of either
national or organizational culture, something that they
recognize as a limitation with the recommendation that
“future research could possibly theorize and examine any
cultural differences”.
Our own search of the information security literature in
scholarly journals discovered only a handful of papers that
draw upon theories of national culture (see Table 1). Of
these, the majority used quantitative surveys based on
convenience samples of university students as opposed to
actual employees. Only three prior studies used qualitative
methods (Flores, Antonsen, & Ekstedt, 2014; Shaaban &
Conrad, 2013; van Wessel, Yang, & de Vries, 2011). This
almost exclusive emphasis on quantitative research meth-
ods within the field of Information Systems (IS) security
has also been noted by Silic and Back (2014) and Karlsson
et al. (2015). Another problem is that several of these
quantitative studies of employee security behavior have
produced contradictory findings (Guo, 2013). Because of
the dearth of rich qualitative studies, our understanding of
the interplay between national culture and information
security behavior is quite poorly developed. Crossler et al.
(2013) remark that the “under-utilization of qualitative 
data sources” is a problem that must be overcome.
Crossler et al. (2013) also identify the lack of cross-
cultural studies as one of the biggest issues in beha-
vioral information security research. They highlight the 
necessity to develop a better understanding of how 
national culture affects security behavior and make 
the point that “studies may need to be adapted to 
account for cross-cultural differences such as uncer-
tainty avoidance (UAI), collectivism-individualism 
(ID V), and power distance (PD I) relationships”. The 
need to conduct comparative international studies is all 
the more important in the global economy, especially 
for organizations that have offices in several countries 
and require employees from different national cultures 
to work closely together in distributed teams (Flores 
et al., 2014; García-Crespo, Colomo-Palacios, Soto-
Acosta, & Ruano-Mayoral, 2010; McHugh, Conboy, & 
Lang, 2011).
The objective of our study is therefore to explore 
how aspects of perceived national culture affect the 
information security attitudes and behavior of employ-
ees in the observed organizations.
Data was collected in Ireland and the US, two countries 
that have not been previously compared as regards infor-
mation security behavior. We followed a qualitative 
approach, conducting face-to-face semi-structured inter-
views with a purposefully selected sample of employees in 
both countries. Although our study did not focus on any 
specific type of security behavior, we broadly aimed to 
distinguish between compliant behavior (i.e. adhering to 
the policies, procedures, and norms of an organization in 
relation to information security) and non-compliant 
behavior (i.e. intentional but non-malicious actions that 
may put organizational information systems at risk).
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows. In 
the following section, we outline the theoretical frame-
work and propositions that underpinned our investiga-
tion. The research method and analytical procedures are 
next explained. We then present and discuss our main 
findings, and finally we conclude with our ideas about 
practical implications and further directions.
Theoretical framework and propositions
Useem, Useem, and Donoghue (1963) define culture as 
“the learned and shared behavior of a community of 
interacting human beings”. A person’s view of the 
world may be shaped by cultural norms rooted in 
their nationality, ethnicity, profession, religion, organi-
zation or other affiliation (Ali & Brooks, 2009). An 
intractable problem in cultural research is the difficulty 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of potential influences upon the behavior of any given
individual. Even though we live in an increasingly
connected and cosmopolitan world, national culture is
very stable and has been shown by prior studies to be
the principal determinant of most individuals’ attitudes
and actions. Notably, it has been found that employees
working in multinational companies are influenced to
a greater extent by their own national culture than by
organizational culture (Adler & Gundersen, 2008;
Shaaban & Conrad, 2013). Regardless of whether
a company is indigenous or a multinational subsidiary,
it resides within a local culture that tends to prevail
over organizational culture (Schneider, 1988). Thus, it
is very important for IT managers to appreciate the
cultural nuances of the societies within which they
operate. Whereas there have been a number of studies
on the relationship between organizational culture and
information security behavior, there are very few which
examine the impact of national culture on security
behavior (Karlsson et al., 2015). This study aims to
contribute towards that gap.
National culture research is largely focused on study-
ing factors that distinguish one society from another
(Leidner & Kayworth, 2006). There are several frame-
works of national culture in the literature (e.g. Hall,
1976; Hofstede, 1980, 2001; Hofstede, Hofstede, &
Minkov, 2010; House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, &
Gupta, 2004; Schwartz, 1994; Trompenaars, 1996).
There is considerable overlap between these various
models, but we decided to adopt Hofstede’s framework
for our study because, notwithstanding its shortcom-
ings (Myers & Tan, 2002), it is very widely recognized
across several disciplines and is, by quite some distance,
the most highly cited model of national culture.
Furthermore, it is one of only two such models that
have been operationalized and for which indicative
values of national culture dimensions have been pub-
lished. The other model which has produced national
indexes is the GLOBE project (House et al., 2004) but it
is not as well established or recognized.
Hofstede (2001, p. 9) describes national culture as “the
collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the
members of one group or category of people fromanother”.
His 6-D model comprises of uncertainty avoidance,
power distance, individualism-collectivism, masculinity-
femininity, long-term orientation and indulgence. These 
six dimensions are explicated by numerical values or 
indices. The index values range from 5 to 112; the higher 
the value, the more pronounced a certain trait is within 
a given society.
We took the position that a score difference of at 
least 10 would be necessary in order to justify a cross-
cultural comparison of the security behavioral implica-
tions of a particular national cultural trait. Our study 
therefore focused on the first three dimensions and 
omitted the latter three because their Hofstede index 
values for Ireland and the US are not materially differ-
ent (see Table 2). In any case, the latter three are of 
little relevance to security behavior.
Uncertainty avoidance
Uncertainty avoidance is defined as “the degree to 
which people in a country feel comfortable with uncer-
tainty and ambiguity” (Hofstede, 2001, p. 145). High 
uncertainty avoidance nations tend to place a strong 
emphasis on laws, policies, procedural controls, and 
formal relationships. Societies that score low on UAI 
are less regulated and more inclined to take risks and 
embrace unpredictable circumstances.
Individuals from high-UAI cultures are generally 
more orderly and willing to accept the primacy of 
rules (House et al., 2004; Hofstede, 2001, p.147; Bik, 
2010). Hofstede (1980) points out that high-UAI 
society members have a greater need for formal rules 
and regulations. Al-Mukahal and Alshare (2015) found 
that the clarity of information security policies is posi-
tively correlated with the number of violations in high 
UAI societies. Given the respective Hofstede UAI 
values for Ireland (35) and the US (46), we expect that:
Proposition 1a: Because of higher uncertainty avoidance, 
US employees have a stronger disposition than Irish 
employees to adopt formalized information security 
controls
Whereas low-UAI can lead to disinterest in informa-
tion security (Asai, Siripukdee, Waluyan, & Noguera, 
2009; Siripukdee, Waluyan, Noguera, & Asai, 2010), 
employees from high-UAI cultures have a greater
Table 2. Hofstede indexes for Ireland and the US.
Dimension Ireland index US index Difference
Uncertainty avoidance (UAI) 35 (very low) 46 (low) 11
Power distance (PDI) 28 (very low) 40 (low) 12
Individualism-collectivism (IND) 70 (high) 91 (very high) 21
Masculinity (MAS) 68 (high) 62 (high) 6
Long-term orientation (LTO) 24 (very low) 26 (very low) 2
Indulgence 65 (high) 68 (high) 3
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need for a “champion” to direct the IT security strategy 
within their organizations (Ifinedo, 2009). In such 
environments, employees strive to avoid any degree of 
ambiguity and thus have a greater desire for formal 
relationships with their superiors. In low-UAI societies, 
individuals favor a more sociable and informal 
atmosphere.
Proposition 2: Because of higher uncertainty avoidance, US 
employees have a greater need than Irish employees to have 
clearly bounded relationships with their superiors.
Clugston, Howell, and Dorfman (2000) report that 
uncertainty avoidance is associated with employee com-
mitment towards an organization. Employee commitment 
refers to the psychological attachment of workers to their 
workplaces (Becker, Billings, Eveleth, & Gilbert, 1996). In 
high-UAI societies, workers are motivated to act in the 
interests of an organization they are working for. 
Therefore, if an organization values information security, 
employees will have a positive attitude towards security 
measures and behave accordingly. On the other hand, 
lower UAI may indicate a lower level of commitment 
towards information security.
Proposition 3: Because of higher uncertainty avoidance, 
US employees place a higher value than Irish employees 
on information security.
Power distance
Power distance is defined as “the degree to which 
status inequality among workers is pronounced in 
society” (Hofstede, 2001, p. 29). High power distance 
indicates a tendency towards authoritarian leadership 
whereas low power distance is said to exist in socie-
ties that follow a more egalitarian philosophy when 
making decisions. Within organizations, power dis-
tance is put into effect through managerial practices 
and the use of formalized controls such as sanctions 
and rewards, education and training, and policies and 
procedures.
Prior studies have found that security policies and 
security education can reduce the level of information 
systems misuse (Connolly, Lang, Gathegi, & Tygar, 
2017; Hovav & D ’Arcy, 2012) but the mere existence 
alone of security policies without proper governance is 
ineffective (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007; Shaaban & Conrad, 
2013). In their proposed research agenda for informa-
tion security, Crossler et al. (2013) suggest that “it is 
likely those who are in high-power distance cultures are 
more readily willing to comply with detailed policy
requirements, whereas those from low-power distance
cultures are likely to pick-and-choose which policies
they feel they should obey.” Although in this study we
are comparing two cultures where the difference in
power distance is not large, we nevertheless aim to
shed some light on Crossler et al.’s proposition.
Given the respective Hofstede PDI values for Ireland
(28) and the US (40), we therefore expect that:
Proposition 1b: Because of greater power distance, US
employees have a stronger disposition than Irish employ-
ees to adopt formalized information security controls.
Hofstede (2001, p. 102) argues that there is a correlation
between a country’s PDI and the nature of hierarchies in
organizations located in that country. Low-PDI countries
establish hierarchies primarily for convenience whereas in
high-PDI countries, rigid lines of command are used to
emphasize managerial authority. Hierarchical organiza-
tions depend heavily on policies and procedures and
employees. Employees are expected to abide by rules and
to comply with the orders of their superiors (Wallach,
1983). Conversely, employees in high-PDI countries expect
their IT managers to provide leadership and guidance and
are uncomfortable when responsibility is delegated (van
Wessel et al., 2011).
The nature of relationships between employees and
their managers is affected by power distance. In high-
PDI countries, leaders demand absolute obedience and
feel no need to cultivate friendly and open relationships
with their employees (Hofstede, 1980). In contrast,
managers in low-PDI societies attempt to bond with
workers in a bid to earn their loyalty, dedication and
diligence (Hofstede, 1980; Wallach, 1983). Although
sociability within the workplace has several benefits
(Goffee & Jones, 1996), it also has drawbacks. For
example, close attachments between managers and
employees may cause poor performance or security
breaches to be deliberately overlooked because of reluc-
tance to censure a friend. Another aspect of manage-
ment style related to power distance is approachability.
Approachable management enhances information
security because employees are not fearful of the nega-
tive consequences of raising concerns with senior staff
(Chipperfield & Furnell, 2010). On the other hand, Asai
and Hakizabera (2010) found that high power distance
can lead to problems with information security because
subordinates feel it is a managerial concern, not theirs.
The challenge therefore for IT security managers is
to get the balance right between the essential formalities
of, on one side, “knowing who is boss” and on the
other, being sociable and approachable. This then
leads to our next proposition:
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Proposition 4: Because of greater power distance, the 
security behavior of US employees is less likely than 
Irish employees to be adversely affected by informal 
aspects of management style.
Individualism-collectivism
Hofstede (2001) defines individualism-collectivism as 
“the degree to which people prefer to emphasize indi-
vidual as opposed to group interests”. In individualistic 
societies, members expect to be accountable for them-
selves and pursue their own goals whereas in collectivist 
societies, people tend to rely more on group support 
networks. Hofstede (2001, p. 212) asserts that “the level 
of individualism or collectivism in society will affect the 
employees’ reasons for complying with organizational 
requirements”. More specifically, in collectivist socie-
ties, if the group they belong to generally exercises safe 
security practices, employees are more likely to follow 
the same standards. On the contrary, in individualistic 
societies, external incentives will have a stronger effect 
on employee compliance. Loyalty to the group in col-
lectivist societies is paramount and may override other 
rules and regulations. Therefore, accepted peer norms 
have a greater influence on behavior in collectivist than 
in individualistic societies (D inev, Goo, Hu, & Nam, 
2009; Hofstede, 1980).
Given the respective Hofstede individualism-
collectivism index values for Ireland (70) and the US 
(91), we expect that:
Proposition 5: Because of lower individualism (higher 
collectivism), Irish employees are more likely than US 
employees to be influenced by group norms of security 
behavior.
The findings of prior studies indicate that greater 
levels of trust amongst employees in high collectivism 
societies can lead to increases in security policy viola-
tions and higher vulnerability to social engineering 
attacks (Al-Mukahal & Alshare, 2015; Shaaban & 
Conrad, 2013). High collectivism can also lead to unin-
tentional sharing of confidential information and 
a tendency to cover up the transgressions of colleagues 
(Asai et al., 2009; Siripukdee et al., 2010). Chen, 
Medlin, and Shaw (2008) found that high individualists 
are more receptive to situational security awareness 
training than high collectivists. The extent of individu-
alism-collectivism can also affect perception and aware-
ness of security threats, sensitivity to privacy issues, and 
perceived coping efficacy (Al-Mukahal & Alshare, 2015; 
Chen & Zahedi, 2016; Kwak, McAlister Kizzier, Zo, &
Jung, 2011; Lowry, Cao, & Everard, 2011; Schmidt, 
Johnston, Arnett, Chen, & Li, 2008).
Proposition 6: Because of lower individualism (higher col-
lectivism), Irish employees are more likely than US employ-
ees to tolerate the security policy breaches of colleagues.
Research method
Study method
Matavire and Brown (2013) identified four grounded 
theory approaches in use within IS research, including 
classic, evolved, mixed methods, and analytical. Of 
these, the analytical method is the most commonly 
used because of its flexibility in selecting grounded 
theory principles, coding techniques, a priori theory, 
and paradigm model.
The methodology that we adopted in this study also 
draws on the analytical grounded theory approach and 
is rather similar to that used by Baskerville and Pries-
Heje (2004) in their cross-cultural study of information 
systems development. We employed the constant com-
parative method as advocated by Maykut and 
Morehouse (1994) for data analysis. This builds on 
the seminal work of Glaser and Strauss (1967) and 
Lincoln and Guba (1985).
The analytical grounded theory approach is charac-
terized by a mix of description and interpretation of 
data. The outcome is an interpretive-explanatory fra-
mework supported by participants’ quotes. Such an 
approach is very suitable for our objective as it enables 
the generation of insights into a relatively under-
researched topic of employee behavior and the explora-
tion of relationships between emerging themes.
Selection of countries and interviewees
To explore our propositions, we conducted 
a comparative study of purposefully selected individuals 
working within organizations in Ireland and the US. 
These two countries were chosen for several reasons.
Firstly, although they speak a common language and 
have some historical linkages, Ireland and the US are 
very far removed from each other, separated by several 
thousand kilometers of ocean. The majority of interna-
tional cross-cultural studies within the discipline of IS 
compare populations drawn from North America and 
Asia; in contrast, cultural gaps between “Western” 
nations are rarely considered and this can lead to false 
suppositions (Hernandez-Ortega, Aldas-Manzano, 
Ruiz-Mafe, & Sanz-Blas, 2017).
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In order to capture rich data, we conducted nineteen
semi-structured face-to-face interviews (9 in the US
and 10 in Ireland) with a purposefully selected sample
drawn from a number of industry sectors, varying from
high-security environments (e.g. financial services
firms) to organizations where security policies are less
well-defined (e.g. small businesses). We deliberately
sought to include a number of similar and dissimilar
organizations within our sample as such an approach is
recommended in order to enhance the trustworthiness
of findings in qualitative research (Miles & Huberman,
1994).
Because our research question was concerned with
perceived national culture, the appropriate unit of ana-
lysis was the individual. This accords with the advice of
Ali and Brooks (2009) that “analyzing the behavior of
an individual of society would not provide a specific
identification of the rules, roles, norms and values of
that society, but rather shows the perception of that
individual of the shared cultures he/she belongs to”. We
then aggregated our findings at the individual level to
form a higher unit of analysis at the level of nations, for
the purposes of cross-cultural comparison.
Cross-cultural research presents particular methodo-
logical challenges as regards data equivalence (Hult
et al., 2008). To this end, it was beneficial that the
interviews in Ireland and the US were conducted in
person by the lead author, who spent extended periods
of time in both regions over the course of this research
project working under the guidance of Irish and
American mentors. Comparable organizations were
selected in both countries based on size, maturity,
industry sector, and level of IT security.
Details about interviewees and their organizations are
provided in Table 3. To respect confidentiality, aliases are
used in place of the organizations’ real names. All aliases
with suffix “US” signify those based in the US, and aliases
with suffix “Irl” are based in Ireland. Our intention was to
interview one person in a managerial position and one
Secondly, Hofstede’s (1980) cultural indices suggest 
that there is a considerable difference between Ireland 
and the US as regards individualism-collectivism (70 ver-
sus 91). This indicates that although both countries are on 
the individualistic end of the spectrum, the US is much 
more so than Ireland. There is also a sizeable variance in 
the respective Hofstede index values for uncertainty 
avoidance with Ireland (35) actually being closer in this 
regard to China (30) and Hong Kong (29) than to the US 
(46). In terms of power distance, Ireland has a low score 
(28) whereas the US has a moderate score (40). 
Furthermore, Asai et al. (2009) classified Hofstede’s 
(1980) cultural scores and put UAI, IDV and PDI in 
different categories, ranging from very low to very high 
Across all three of these dimensions, the differences 
between the US and Ireland are of such magnitude that 
they cannot be assumed to be inconsequential. A number 
of previous studies have compared Irish and American 
national cultures. De Pillis and Reardon (2007) found 
significant dissimilarities between the personality traits 
and entrepreneurial outlook of US and Irish students 
which they attributed to differences on the individualism-
collectivism spectrum. Alderson and Kakabadse (1994) 
and Keating, Martin, Resick, and Dickson (2007) revealed 
disparities between attitudes towards business ethics 
amongst managers in Ireland and the US, which they 
also explained by reference to individualism-collectivism 
differences. Given the pertinence of ethics to the field of 
information systems security and privacy, these findings 
are notable and worthy of further enquiry.
Thirdly, given that several US technology companies 
have a substantial presence in Ireland, including 
Facebook, Dell and Microsoft, it is important to under-
stand how variations in cultural norms impact local infor-
mation security practices within these multinational 
corporations. Notably, the US and Ireland have quite dif-
ferent regulatory approaches as regards privacy and data 
protection; this is indicative of different national cultures 
and attitudes (Cockroft & Rekker, 2016).
Table 3. Profile of interviewees.
Organization Alias Industry; Years Established; Size Number and roles of interviewees
CloudSerUS (multinational) IT; 15 years; large 1 person: Software Developer
RetCoUS Finance; >80 years; large 1 person: Security Executive
CivEngCoUS Civil Engineering; >70 years; SME 1 person: Civil Engineer
TechCorpUS * (multinational) IT; 50 years; large 2 people: Security Researchers
EducInstUS Education; >100 years; large 2 people: Administrator & Professor
FinCoUS (multinational) Finance; >30 years; large 1 person: Security Consultant
PublCoUS Publishing; 10 years; SME 1 person: Business Owner
TechCorpIrl * (Multinational) IT; >40 years; large 2 people: Product Manager & IT Executive
CharOrgIrl Charity; >100 years; large 1 person: Data Protection Officer
BevCorpIrl (multinational) Beverage Manufacturing; >70 years; large 1 person: IT Executive
PublOrgIrl Publishing; 15 years; SME 1 person: Chief Editor
EducOrgIrl Education; >100 years; large 2 people: Administrator & Professor
TelCommCorpIrl (multinational) IT; 30 years; large 1 person: Software Developer
ResRegIrl Energy Regulation; 15 years; SME 1 person: Policy Analyst
BankOrgIrl (multinational) Finance; >30 years; large 1 person: Security Executive
* TechCorpUS and TechCorpIrl are subsidiaries of the same multinational corporation
6
regular employee within each organization so as to form 
a sense of the contrasting views of persons with different 
levels of awareness of information security. As it turned 
out, this proved to be problematic due to access issues. 
Nevertheless, out of the nineteen interviewees, eight were 
information security experts, six had very good knowledge, 
and five had basic knowledge. The gender balance of 
interviewees was similar in both countries: 6 males and 3 
females in the US versus 7 males and 3 females in Ireland. 
The Irish interviewees were all of white Irish extraction 
whereas the US interviewees were of mixed ethnicity. The 
typical duration of interviews was about fifty minutes, 
resulting in 543 pages of transcribed text. An interview 
guide containing a list of possible questions was prepared 
and used. Sample interview questions are provided in 
Appendix 1.
Data collection and analytical procedures
Following the principle of theoretical sampling, data was 
collected in four stages (see Figure 1). In the first stage, four 
interviews in US organizations of various sizes and with 
different levels of security were conducted. Phase 1 (open 
coding) and phase 2 (categorization of codes) of data 
analysis were then executed (see Figure 2 for the full cycle 
of data analysis). The categories generated took two forms:
participant-driven and researcher-driven. Having segmen-
ted and labelled the body of data and generated a set of
first-round provisional categories, one-third of incidents or
units were examined and placed into one or more of these
categories. Analysis of their content gave rise to the forma-
tion of additional provisional categories. As the process
unfolded, connections between emerged categories started
to arise and these provisional results guided further data
collection.
The second stage of data collection involved inter-
viewing additional US organizations where traits iden-
tified in the initial data analysis were either present or
absent in order to confirm the link between national
culture values and employee security behavior. To
select suitable organizations, a short questionnaire was
conducted by telephone with potential participants.
Subsequently, five interviews were conducted, and the
entire body of US data was then subjected to the first
two phases of analysis again.
This procedure was then repeated in Ireland. In
particular, the third stage of data collection involved
selecting Irish organizations which were comparable in
terms of the size and level of security to the organiza-
tions that had been studied in the first stage of collec-
tion in the US. Five interviews were conducted with
Irish organizations and data was analysed. Concepts
and associations emerged from the Irish data which
were similar to the provisional findings that had
emerged from the initial stage of US data analysis.
Therefore, the sample selection criteria for the fourth
stage of data collection (i.e. the second stage in Ireland)
were similar to those which had been used to choose
organizations for the second stage of data collection in
the US. Three organizations located in Ireland which
were comparable, in terms of the size and level of
security, to the US organizations earlier selected were
chosen for further interviewing. Five more interviews
were conducted in these organizations.
Phase 3 of data analysis (“coding on”) involved further
breaking down the incidents that were identified in the
initial phase. The results of the first three phases of data
analysis is presented in Figure 3. In phase 4 of analysis, the
provisional categories identified in the second phase were
analysed for their characteristics and properties so as to
develop ‘rules for inclusion’ in the form of propositional
statements, coupled with sample data. As a ‘rule of inclu-
sion’ was developed for each category, the remaining two-
thirds of the data segments were analysed, compared and
coded. As the constant comparative procedure pro-
gressed, data incidents that fitted with a ‘rule for inclu-
sion’ validated that category and emerging theoretical
insights. Furthermore, data incidents that failed to fit
with existing categories generated leads to the formation
Figure 1. Stages of data collection guided by the theoretical 
sampling principle.
Figure 2. Data analysis framework – full cycle.
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and predictable, with few if any new insights emerging. In 
this study, we felt that we reached this point of diminish-
ing returns after a total of nine interviews in the US and 
ten in Ireland because the incremental learning from each 
case had by then reached a plateau.
Findings
The results of our analysis revealed similarities and 
differences between the US and Irish data sets in the 
observed organizations. Across the whole body of data, 
the three principal common findings that emerged were 
(1) the presence of formalized controls is associated 
with higher levels of compliant security behavior, (2) 
high levels of sociability in the workplace can give rise 
to non-compliant security behavior, and (3) flatter 
organizational structures with lower communicational 
barriers between managers and employees are helpful 
in improving information security. These findings are 
not surprising in their own right, but what is interesting 
is the varying extent to which they were observed in 
each country. We deliberately selected organizations in 
Ireland and the US that were comparable in terms of 
size and other characteristics, so it is notable that, on 
analysis of the findings, several important differences 
were discovered between the behavior of US and Irish 
employees based in similar workplaces. Five of the 
categories that emerged during data analysis differed 
substantially as regards the number of times they were 
mentioned by Irish or US interviewees (see Table 4).
Information security value, formalized controls and 
workplace relationships
One of the principal categories that emerged during 
data analysis was “high information security value”. 
All cases classified under this category exhibited the 
following traits: (1) information assets are protected,
(2) the organization is continually attempting to 
improve its information security, and (3) the organiza-
tion stringently enforces its information security rules 
and practices (see Figure 3). Conversely, we identified 
an opposite category which we labelled “low informa-
tion security value”, characterized by the following 
traits: (1) information assets are not protected, (2) 
information security rules and good practices are not 
enforced, and (3) there is a lack of senior management 
support. All cases were classified as either high or low 
information security value; in one of the US cases, the 
interviewee did not explicitly refer to the value placed 
on security so we inferred that it was low.
In organizations where information security is 
highly valued, assets are protected by means of rules,
Figure 3. C odes and categories identified in the first three 
phases of data analysis.
�Figure 4. Results of comparative analysis.
of additional categories. Over the course of this analytical 
process, categories underwent various changes. While 
some of them were substantiated quickly, others were 
eliminated as irrelevant to the focus of inquiry. Some 
were merged due to overlaps or needed to be redefined 
and new categories emerged.
In phase 5 of analysis, common and unique codes from 
both data sets were merged into a common framework in 
order to facilitate a comparative analysis between Ireland 
and the US (Figure 4), followed by data reduction in phase 
6. The final three phases of data analysis were executed 
simultaneously. In qualitative research, resource con-
straints often dictate when data collection ends but 
a point of sufficient “theoretical saturation” is normally 
reached after about a dozen or so observations 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 30–31). 
There is no absolute rule here so the decision to ultimately 
stop collecting data is made when the researcher reaches 
the stage where interviewees responses become repetitive
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procedures, technical controls, and physical security;
security education and training programmes and con-
tinuous improvement initiatives are in place; and
employee security practices are closely monitored. On
the other hand, organizations, where information
security is a low priority, have few if any policies or
procedures and security is very loose.
We found that US organizations place a much
higher value on information security. 78% of study
participants from the US as compared to just 30%
from Ireland report that their organizations value infor-
mation security highly. On more detailed content ana-
lysis of the transcripts, the number of excerpts coded
“high information security value” in all of the Irish
interviews was just 35 as opposed to 109 in the US
interviews, thus providing strong empirical support for
Proposition 3. By way of an example, the Security
Executive of RetCoUs stated that:
“My organization sees the value in information security.
We have a very low risk appetite for information secur-
ity incidents. We are currently doing a lot of changes in
our information security program, updating all our
policies, procedures and practices because information
security is always changing so we have to keep up to
date.”
Typically, a security policy outlines an organization’s
information security requirements and the rules that
derive from those requirements. The policy may also
provide information on sanctions or rewards. The pur-
pose of security training is to educate employees about
policies and to clearly explain why rules are in place.
This is very important because if employees do not
understand the significance of a certain rule, they may
feel that the effort required to follow a rule is not
justified and may consequently choose to deliberately
violate it.
Nearly all of the US organizations had information
security policies in place which interviewees considered
to be effective. Moreover, there was a very high level of
awareness of policies and procedures amongst US
employees, as well as an acceptance of the need for
such policies:
“Information security is a central function across our
organization … Generally, people accept that security
policy is there for a good reason … We have mandatory
training for every employee right from the CEO down.”
(Software Developer, CloudSerUS)
“Information security policy dictates things like what
should I do with registered secret documents and
I have to follow these rules.” (Security Researcher 1,
TechCorpUS)
“The security practices in my organization are fairly
extensive – we have SOX and GLBA compliant environ-
ment.” (Security Consultant, FinCoUS)
“There are a lot of security rules in my company.
Whenever we access confidential information or receive
a document, we should be very cautious. Think about it
twice: ‘Is it OK to print a document at home? Is it OK to
store this document on my laptop?’ We need to conform
with the company’s security rules because they are a very
effective way to protect our priority assets. You can get
fired for breaking required rules.” (Security Researcher 2,
TechCorpUS)
In comparison, Irish employees were much more lax.
Only one interviewee from Ireland reported that their
organization has an effective information security pol-
icy in place. In all the other organizations, it was said to
be either ineffective or non-existent. Several Irish
respondents cited incidents where information security
policies were not enforced or taken seriously:
“When you start, you get all these rules about physical
security, only letting badges go through the doors and
not holding doors open for people. But everyone holds
the doors open. We do not take physical security in my
organization too seriously.” (Software Developer,
TelCommCorpIrl)
“I have a work laptop which I regularly bring in to the
office and take back home again at the end of the day,
a lot of people do that. I am pretty careful with it but
I know people who’ve had laptops lost or stolen. Is there
a written-down encryption policy? I am not aware of
one. If there is a policy, is it complied with? Absolutely
not. Is there a whole load of sensitive data on these
machines? Absolutely, there is. In truth, data protection
and IT security are well down the order of priorities
here.” (Professor, EducOrgIrl)






Associated national culture dimension(s)% of interviewees No. of mentions % of interviewees No. of mentions
High information security value 30% 35 78% 109 Power distance,
Uncertainty avoidanceLow information security value 70% 78 22% 8
Compliant behavior (individual) * 40% 32 89% 79 Power distance,
Uncertainty avoidanceNon-compliant behavior
(individual)
80% 96 56% 61
Non-compliant behavior (group) 80% 26 33% 9 Individualism-Collectivism
* The reason that compliant behavior (individual) and non-compliant behavior (individual) sum to more than 100% is because some interviewees provided
examples of both types of behavior within their organizations.
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In relation to security education and training pro-
grammes, similar differences in attitudes were revealed.
Only two of the Irish interviewees said that security
training received genuine attention in their workplace.
As one of them put it,
“Security training is a token, to be honest. Information
security is not taken too seriously.” (Software Developer,
TelCommCorpIrl)
At BevCorpIrl, an IT Executive said that employees
continuously break information security rules and he
put this down to the lack of visible policies and effective
training:
“There are information security policies, but they are
hidden away on some website someplace, you have to go
looking for them, they are not in front of people’s
faces … We really should put very simple policies in
place and give clear business reasons for why they are
necessary. I think people need to be educated a little bit
more.”
In contrast, almost all the US interviewees reported that
there was a strong emphasis on security education and
awareness in their organizations:
“Educating employees to make the right choices is very
important. It is better to educate people as to why some
rule is there, or why you should not go to certain sites, or
why you should not do something within the corporate
firewall.” (Software Developer, CloudSerUS)
“Employee security training speaks directly to changing
behavior of employees.” (Security Executive, RetCoUS)
The results indicate that US employees in the
observed organizations tend to embrace formalized
security controls and countermeasures to a greater
degree than their counterparts in Ireland. In the US,
the information security environments in the organi-
zations that we observed were quite formal and struc-
tured, as opposed to the casual atmosphere that
prevailed in the majority of Irish organizations. On
the basis of our observations, we are inclined to
accept Propositions 1a and 1b within the bounds of
our sample, recognizing of course that a larger scale
study would be required to test its broader applic-
ability. It is plausible to suggest that the higher values
of PDI and UAI in the US as opposed to Ireland can
explain why US employees in the observed organiza-
tions are more inclined to adopt formalized informa-
tion security controls.
Turning then to Proposition 2 and the nature of
workplace relationships, we found several instances of
“approachable management style” in both Ireland and
the US. In general, interviewees felt that this tends to
lead to improved information security in organizations:
“A lot of times employees, through having this open
dialogue, can change the rules by bringing things up.”
(Security Executive, RetCoUS)
An IT Executive from TechCorpIrl explained how
management tries to encourage employees to speak
their mind in order to improve the organization’s
processes:
“We have this concept called ‘Bureaucracy Busting’ … so
if something is too bureaucratic, challenge it! Bring it up
to whoever is the policy owner. And if you think that
something you are doing is hurting the company’s com-
petitive advantage, challenge it! When security is just too
bureaucratic or too much of an overhead, then we
encourage people to stop it.”
Similarly, several instances of “high sociability manage-
ment style” were also cited in both countries. However,
this was found to be problematic in many cases because
of adverse impact on security behavior, more so in
Ireland than in the US:
“In a sociable environment such as here, people tend to
trust each other an awful lot and occasionally informa-
tion is released to colleagues who do not have actual
privileges to see that information.” (Professor,
EducOrgIrl)
“People are probably more lax in terms of information
security because of a friendly atmosphere. You might
tend to say or do something that you would not if it
was a more dogmatic kind of organization around
[information security] rules.” (Software Developer,
TelCommCorpIrl)
“Because things are so informal here, that leads to
a certain amount of casualness with treating informa-
tion.” (Professor, EducInstUS)
We found that whereas there is a considerable degree of
informality in manager-employee relationships in both
the US and Ireland, there is a greater sense of respect
for the authority of managers in the US and boundaries
in the chain of command are clearer. In some instances,
this was very pronounced:
“This is an old company and there is hierarchy: manage-
ment are up there, and we are below them and they
want to make sure it exists.” (Civil Engineer,
CivEngCoUS)
“I do not think it is my place to disagree with manage-
ment. And that is not just a tacit assumption, it is very
much part of the hierarchy in the business: there is
a business owner, then there is a manager, and only then
there is an employee.” (Security Consultant, FinCoUS)
Because the US has a higher PDI than Ireland, this
suggests that American citizens have a greater willing-
ness to accept authority and control, including forma-
lized measures such as information security policies
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and security education programmes. Indeed, following 
Hofstede, we suggest that this goes beyond willingness; 
it may well be an expectation. That said, the evidence 
that we found in support of Proposition 2 is rather 
tentative and we cannot claim with conviction that it 
holds within our observed sample.
Information security behavior of individual 
employees
Although our findings indicate that high sociability can 
lead to undesired behavior, and high sociability is pre-
valent across organizations from both countries, com-
parative analysis indicates that, overall, employees from 
the observed organizations in the US are more compli-
ant with information security rules than their counter-
parts in Ireland. Thus, we choose to accept Proposition 
4 within the bounds of our chosen sample. When asked 
a direct question (see Table A1), 89% of US participants 
responded that they always comply with rules as 
opposed to just 40% of Irish interviewees. The general 
perspective of the US employees is summed up by these 
selective comments:
“I do not violate information security rules … As long as
you follow the rules, you are fine. That is the baseline –
you need to follow the rules.” (Security Researcher 2,
TechCorpUS)
“I do not see anybody breaking information security
rules. People do not mess around with the stuff to
cause problems.” (Civil Engineer, CivEngCoUS)
Furthermore, a very high (80%) proportion of Irish
interviewees cited incidents of individuals within their
organizations not complying with or circumventing
security rules:
“There is a rule that we have to clear our desks of all
documents at the end of the day because cleaners and
different people come in [after hours]. But I do not
always clean my desk, I am not 100% on that particular
rule.” (Policy Analyst, ResRegIrl)”
“All our data centers are heavily locked down, you need
badge access to enter. But you often see incidences where
somebody swipes in to the data center and then two other
people follow right behind them without swiping their
badge … Another example of a rule that gets broken is
encryption. We encrypt all our laptops, but the downside
is that it makes the laptop perform a little bit slower. So
what you find is that some people try to avoid the encryp-
tion policy.” (IT Executive, TechCorpIrl)
“Sometimes you go down the route of implementing
a rule, and then an employee up the chain might want
access to a certain website that they should not be
getting access to. Essentially, I have to circumvent the
rule for this person. I think the rules should be the same
for everybody, but they are not and there is nothing
I can do about it.” (Security Executive, BankOrgIrl)
We suspect that there may be a cultural bias in the
responses here. Breaking rules is generally not considered
as serious an issue in Ireland as it is in the US and Irish
respondents from the observed organizations may there-
fore have been more willing to openly admit that they do
not always comply. Within the transcripts, there is ample
evidence of non-compliance in the US because, despite
saying that they personally never break rules, 56% of US
interviewees reported occurrences of non-compliant
behavior within their organizations, in some cases includ-
ing themselves. This pair of quotes from the same inter-
viewee is an example of such denial and contradiction:
“I do not think that I violate any information security
rules. I use security practices especially with social secur-
ity numbers and birth dates and addresses to make sure
that my tracks are covered. And as far as [destroying
information], you need to check multiple times and
make sure that the possibility [for hackers] is not
there.” (Administrator, EducInstUS)
“ … our IT Department constantly reminds people to not
leave their computers logged in if unattended but as long
as a colleague is in the office, I feel that it’s OK to pop out
for a few minutes.” (Administrator, EducInstUS)
In this particular case, a separate interviewee within the 
same organization commented that “what is officially 
on the books and what the actual practice are – those 
are two different things”. Nevertheless, the overall 
impression that emerges is that employees within the 
US organizations that we studied are more compliant 
with information security rules than the Irish subjects. 
We believe that this may be because of higher PDI in 
the US, as a result of which employees have a higher 
level of tolerance towards authority and seniority.
Information security behavior of groups
In addition to isolated examples of individual non-
compliance, we also looked at endemic non-
compliance at the level of work groups. Interestingly, 
we found that group non-compliance is a more com-
mon occurrence amongst Irish employees than 
amongst US employees in the observed organizations. 
While only 33% of the US interviewees cited instances 
of group non-compliance, 80% of Irish respondents did 
so. Not alone did most of the Irish interviewees speak 
of this phenomenon but they also provided several 
examples. It therefore appears to be much more wide-
spread than in the US:
“ … I think that [breaking rules] is kind of an Irish 
thing, ‘Sure, this rule does not apply to me because
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I have a good excuse’. I have seen plenty of rules being
broken, people bypass IT policies to get stuff done. Not
all rules are equal, some are seen as more valuable than
others.” (IT Executive, BevCorpIrl)
“If the PC police were beside our cubicle, we would all be
fired a long time ago [for breaking information security
rules].” (Software Developer, TelCommCorpIrl)
“It is not acceptable to break rules. That is not to say
that rules do not get broken … Confidential documents
tend to float around and people say, ‘Let’s keep it
between us’. So sometimes people get their hands-on
information that technically speaking they should not
have gotten their hands on.” (Professor, EducOrgIrl)
Furthermore, we found evidence that there is
a considerable level of ambivalence towards this type
of behavior:
“The level of acceptance for this from peers is high. It is
not like if one person broke a rule, everyone would be
going ‘Oh!’. They are not going to tell on somebody.” (IT
Executive, BevCorpIrl)
“There is one guy [who is particularly bad]. We always
poke fun at him that the HR are outside his door or
coming for him.” (Software Developer,
TelCommCorpIrl)
Ireland compared to the US because Ireland is 
a more collectivist society. We therefore choose to 
accept Proposition 5 and Proposition 6 within the 
bounds of our observed sample. This may mean that 
the Irish organizations that we studied are more vul-
nerable to social engineering attacks or security 
breaches by rogue internal agents. Summary of find-
ings are presented in Table 5.
Conclusions
Adler and Gundersen (2008, p. 14) make the point that 
American managers are quite parochial and tend to 
view the issues of other nations only through their 
own cultural perspective. Indeed, it could be argued 
that many researchers are also culpable in this regard. 
For example, Chen and Zahedi (2016) refer to the US as 
“an exemplar of modern Western society”. It is perhaps 
because of such assumptions that there are hardly any 
comparative studies of information security practices 
between the US and European nations, with the excep-
tions of van Wessel et al. (2011), Flores et al. (2014), 
and the global studies conducted by Ifinedo (2009) and 
Simon and Cagle (2017). However, our findings reveal 
that there are considerable differences between the Irish 
and US data sets used in this study.
Practical implications
Although the majority of the studied organizations had 
a culture of high sociability, and it was observed that this 
can inadvertently lead to non-compliant behavior, com-
parative analysis revealed that, overall, employees based in 
the US are more compliant with information security rules 
than employees located in Ireland. This finding has inter-
esting implications, suggesting that management’s friendli-
ness and trust in Ireland are interpreted by employees in 
the observed organizations as a form of implicit permission 
to neglect formalized controls, including information
This finding may possibly be explained by the differ-
ent levels of IDV in the United States (90) and 
Ireland (71). Hofstede (2001) asserts that in collecti-
vist societies, individuals tend to be influenced by 
group culture. In particular, if an individual belongs 
to a group where the majority of members behave in 
accordance with organizational requirements, it is 
more likely that the individual will exhibit the same 
behavioral patterns. On the other hand, in individua-
listic societies, members tend to be more independent 
of social bonds in making their decisions and external 
incentives have a stronger effect on employee com-
pliance than group culture. As a result, it is possible 
that group non-compliance is more prevalent in






1a: Because of higher uncertainty avoidance, US employees have a stronger disposition than Irish employees to
adopt formalized information security controls
4.1 Yes
1b: Because of greater power distance, US employees have a stronger disposition than Irish employees to adopt
formalized information security controls
4.1 Yes
2: Because of higher uncertainty avoidance, US employees have a greater need than Irish employees to have
clearly bounded relationships with their superiors
4.1 Insufficient evidence
3: Because of higher uncertainty avoidance, US employees place a higher value than Irish employees on
information security
4.1 Yes
4: Because of greater power distance, the security behavior of US employees is less likely than Irish employees to
be adversely affected by informal aspects of management style
4.2 Yes
5: Because of lower individualism (higher collectivism), Irish employees are more likely than US employees to be
influenced by group norms of security behavior
4.3 Yes
6: Because of lower individualism (higher collectivism), Irish employees are more likely than US employees to
tolerate the security policy breaches of colleagues
4.3 Yes
12
security rules. It may be that IT and security managers need 
to draw a clearer line between friendliness and formality, 
and increase awareness among employees that following 
information security rules is an absolute requirement 
despite the friendly atmosphere. Our findings also demon-
strate that management’s approachability tends to lead to 
improved information security in organizations but, as 
with high sociability, management’s approachability may 
be misconstrued by employees in the observed Irish orga-
nizations. It may be that management’s friendliness and 
approachability develop into personal relationships, redu-
cing the effect of formality to a minimum. Therefore, 
preserving professionalism within Irish organizations is 
important and must be exercised by management. 
A lower score on individualism in Ireland may explain 
this observation – in collectivist societies, personal relation-
ships prevail over the task and the company. On the con-
trary, in individualistic societies, the task and the company 
come before the personal relationship.
Interviewees from both countries suggest that for-
malized controls tend to encourage compliant behavior. 
However, US employees in the observed organizations 
place higher priority on security measures than their 
Irish counterparts. Unsurprisingly, the lax attitude 
towards formalized security controls within organiza-
tions located in Ireland is translated into employee 
non-compliant behavior of employees. Hence, imple-
menting appropriate security controls backed up by 
training programmes is essential in order to improve 
employee security practices.
Additionally, we found that group non-compliance 
is widespread amongst employees in observed organi-
zations located in Ireland. D ue to a lower level of 
individualism in Ireland, individuals tend to be influ-
enced by group culture. Employees are likely to follow 
practices that are acceptable within a social group they 
belong to as opposed to formal rules. In order to 
change existing attitudes and practices within organiza-
tions, it is essential to employ inspiring, confident and 
impartial individuals that are able to lead in collectivist 
environments despite the strong social bonds developed 
within groups. It may be that the hiring processes of 
security managers within Irish organizations require 
changes. For example, the skill set that an individual 
must possess in order to be able to lead in such envir-
onments could be defined.
Limitations and further work
Although we employed various techniques such as 
member checks and peer debriefing to avoid bias in 
qualitative data analysis, there is still a possibility that 
our interpretations had some element of subjectivity.
A further limitation of qualitative research is the inabil-
ity to generalize findings. That aim can only be
achieved through a large-scale survey but, as mentioned
at the outset of this paper, the survey method has been
extensively used within information security research
and yet there are so many behavioral issues that remain
quite poorly understood (Crossler et al., 2013; Karlsson
et al., 2015). Our goal was not to make sweeping infer-
ences but rather to build a richer, contextualized pic-
ture of national culture and its relationship with
employee security behavior. The findings presented
herein are applicable only within the observed setting.
It is very difficult – indeed, probably impossible – to
fully isolate the effects of national culture from organiza-
tional culture. We attempted to do so by engaging
a number of strategies. Firstly, the sampling approach
that we followed was theoretically-driven. We sought to
have variety within the sample so that there were simila-
rities and dissimilarities between the settings.
A comparable range of organizations (as regards size,
industry sector and maturity) was selected in Ireland and
theUS so that we could pair themwith each other as closely
as possible; for example, BankOrgIrl was paired with
FinCoUs, TechCorpIrl with TechCorpUS, EducOrgIrl
with EducInstUS, PublOrgIrl with PublCoUS, and
BevCorpIrl with RetCoUS (see Table 3). This meant that
we were comparing like with like as regards the composi-
tion of the basket of organizations on both sides. Secondly,
we compared findings within each country across different
types of organizations, which enabled us to identify key
behavioral patterns within each country that seemed to be
independent of organizational type. Thirdly, we compared
the aggregate findings between countries and validated
them against Hofstede’s index values for Ireland and the
US. Notwithstanding the inherent shortcomings and lim-
itations of our research approach, we are quite confident,
having spent a considerable period of time meticulously
analyzing the data using the constant comparison method,
that the differences that we observed between US and Irish
employees are real and genuine.
The bottom line is that we had US interviewees on one
side, from different organizations and different roles, and
Irish interviewees on the other side, again from different
organizations and different roles, yet the majority of the
US interviewees, despite their dissimilarities, were
observed to exhibit a number of common behavioral
tendencies that were quite different from the majority of
the Irish interviewees. As the only common denominator
between the US interviewees is that they were exposed to
US national culture, we submit that it is this influence that
primarily distinguishes them from the Irish participants,
who were exposed to Irish national culture. Otherwise
put, we believe that national culture is the most likely
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cause of the observed behavioral differences between the 
US and Irish interviewees because (1) it is the principal 
behavioral influence that they all share in common, and 
(2) it is a very strong behavioral influence, given that an 
individual’s sense of belonging to a nation lies at the very 
core of their personal identity. This conclusion is vali-
dated by the fact that the differences that we observed 
were consistent with the respective index values captured 
by Hofstede i.e. the interviewees in US organizations were 
found to be individualistic and respect rules, whereas Irish 
employees are influenced by group norms and have a lax 
attitude towards any form of formal controls.
Future research could include a follow-up survey 
or mixed methods study to test the applicability of 
our conclusions in a broader context. More specifi-
cally, a questionnaire could be distributed in US and 
Irish organizations with the purpose of measuring 
variables outlined in Table 4 in two different cultural 
environments. The results then could be statistically 
generalized across two countries. It might also be 
beneficial to expand this study by replicating it in 
other sets of nations across the globe to potentially 
reveal different patterns of security behaviors and 
attitudes in other national cultural environments. 
Another possible way of moving forward would be 
to explore how cultural characteristics moderate the 
relationships between the antecedents to compliance 
and compliance itself, perhaps using a quantitative 
technique such as structural equation modeling. 
There is quite a body of existing work on antecedents 
to information security policy compliance (Moody 
et al., 2018) but, apart from a few of the aforemen-
tioned studies listed in Table 1, the role of national 
culture in this mix has been largely ignored.
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Is there an information security policy in your organization? If yes, are you familiar with its content? How does the









Is it acceptable to break rules in your organization? Did you ever break a rule? Do you ever violate information security rules?




What type of workplace atmosphere is there in your organization (e.g. friendly, strict, competitive etc.)? Do you think the
atmosphere affects information security practices and rules in your organization? If yes, then how? Do you think the




Do you ever voluntarily work overtime in order to finish some important task? Uncertainty avoidance
Power distance
Individualism-Collectivism
Do you ever put your company goals before your personal goals? Individualism-Collectivism
Is it common in your organization to disagree with the opinion or decision of a superior? Do you think the perception of
whether or not you can challenge organizational decisions affects information security practices and rules of your





Is it easy to approach your immediate manager? Do you think the perception of whether or not your immediate manager is
approachable affects your behavior with regards to information systems security? How?
Uncertainty avoidance
Power distance
How common a practice is it within your workplace to attend evening outings with your colleagues including management?
Is it common to have non-work-related chats with your colleagues during work hours? Do you think the perception of




To what extent do your colleagues’ values affect your behavior with regards to information systems security? Uncertainty avoidance
Power distance
Individualism-Collectivism
In your opinion, how well is confidential information protected in your organization? Uncertainty avoidance
Power distance
The use of the word “organization” in the sample questions shown below was intended to prevent interviewees from offering potentially misinformed
opinions about information security practices occurring in other settings outside their sphere of direct experience. In this regard, our line of questioning is
similar to that used by Hofstede (2001, pp. 467–474).
17
